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THE U.S. NAVY'S HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS:
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE U.S.S.
KITTYHAWK/CONSTELLATION RACIAL INCIDENTS

by
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ABSTRACT

This paper was conceived and written due to my alarm at finding students in the Master's Degree and Ph.D. category, many from top universities, almost devoid of the military history component of learning impinging upon current Human Resources Management (HRM) problems in the Armed Forces. The size of this monograph does not allow for an indepth look at all of the services. Hence the paper centers on those historical forces which created the U.S. Navy's need for people-oriented programs. Since the aim and goal of the core course in HRM at the Naval Postgraduate School is to bring the officer-students up to current realities and processes of program promulgation, Part II is included. Where Part I deals with the pre-Vietnam history and HRM efforts, Part II presents the Post-U.S.S. Kittyhawk and U.S.S. Constellation (incidents which catapulted the Navy into the negative-glare of the U.S. news media) HRM effort, its program design and implementation methodologies aimed at HRM institutionalization, thus moving the U.S. Navy from the current, vulnerable-reactive-posture to the less-vulnerable-proactive posture, required by the times. It is hoped that this paper will aid in (1) dispelling rumors about the program, (2) lessen the frustration of serious military leaders (due to rapidity of social change and emotion laden-content addressed) and (3) enable them to "buy-in" to the current HRM effort in a manner that possibly extends their "leadership-reach".

THE U. S. NAVY'S HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE USS KITTYHAWK/CONSTELLATION RACIAL INCIDENTS

PART I

I. Introductory History:

Unknown to most present day Naval officers, enlisted personnel and lay citizens the U. S. Navy was, initially, the most liberal of all American armed forces; in early American history, with the exception of its officers corps which remained basically lily white until WWII. The reason for this liberalism was a very pragmatic one. It took an unusual man to withstand two years before the mast on a Windjammer. Such a man had to possess the physical, psychological and genetic endowments needed for the rigors of life in the age of sail. The qualifications were similar to those for slavery. Where sheer harshness is concerned, life at sea and slavery were very much akin. The similarity between the two rested upon the fact that the ultimate method of compelling obedience for both the black man and white man as well, was the cat o'nine tails. Sea Captains were democratic in their sometimes diabolical cruelty and simply did not give a tinkers damn about the color of the backs they whipped. Yet the sea also furnished an avenue whereby the oppressed could become men in their own right. If you were skilled in a craft in this exacting profession you were respected. If you were an incompetent you were disrespected and your color did not hide your lack. Consequently, the sea was always a place for run-away slaves, white men on the lam and renegade Indians. U. S. Naval officers in the early years, and indeed up to WWI, were a hard-headed practical lot. If a man had the toughness and ability they simply said to hell with regulations

and Congress. Trying to obtain and keep a decent crew was an awesome job. Before the closing of the frontier in the latter 1800's, sailors simply went unauthorized absence and moved West if they became unhappy. Captains who needed crews obtained them by the very means verbalized by black militants in today's ghettos--by any means necessary!

As an example the Army let racism retard recruiting and caused massive defection of black slaves to the British during the Revolution:

George Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army discouraged the enlistment of Negroes. Washington backed down when Lord Dunmore issued a proclamation giving all Negro slaves their freedom when they joined the British forces. Negroes ran away in droves. Georgia lost, according to John Hope Franklin, 75% of its 15,000 slaves...

Thomas Jefferson estimated that in 1778 alone more than 30,000 Virginia slaves ran away. Ramsey, the South Carolina historian asserted that between 1775 and 1783 his state lost at least 25,000 Negroes.¹

This caused Washington to back paddle and 5,000 Negroes fought in the Revolution. The Navy suffered no such problems because it ignored Washington's order. There is no historical fact known to this writer that would indicate that the Navy followed any course of rejection based upon color as a matter of policy until the eve of WWI. Nor did they obey Congress when it restricted enlistment to "able bodied white males" at the end of the Revolution and the period between the Revolution and the War of 1812. This is substantiated by the factual existence of Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry's correspondence with Commodore Isaac Chauncy, whereby he was chided by Chauncy for negative remarks about Negroes. (on file in the Library of Congress; These papers reveal that blacks

¹Franklin, J. H., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans, Random House, New York, 1969, p. 134.

with years of sea service were in the Navy at the start of the War of 1812, many were aboard Chauncy's flagship, the Hartford. Nor did Naval officers obey the racist edict issued after 1812 again restricting service in the Armed forces to able bodied white males. This proof finds basis in the fact that for the first and only time in U. S. history the U. S. Army fought a war that did not contain a sizable black contingent. I speak of course, of the Mexican War of 1845 and the U. S. quest for "Manifest Destiny." This would indicate that the Army obeyed the restrictive order. There were, however, many black sailors aboard the American ships that seized the Vera Cruz. It would appear that hard-headed Naval officers had again ignored a racist edict issued from above. Possibly two events in U. S. history set in motion the negative concepts of race that led to the Navy's present problems. One of these was technological and the other was socio-political in nature:

Technological: The "Battle of the Iron Clads" fought between the Merrimac and the Monitor in Hampton Roads, Virginia in 1862 during the Civil War, spelled death for the era of sail and ushered in the age of steam navigation. Few blacks possessed the formal education needed to operate as lead-men and Petty officers in the then sophisticated machinery divisions. Most served as coal heavers in the new technology area up to the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Socio-political: Southern whites chaffing under "carpet bag rule" and occupation by the largest peace-time army in U. S. history flooded into the frontier army and navy. These bitter men reached "Command Rank" by 1898 (Spanish-American War) and "Flag Rank" by 1915 (WWI) at which time they, with humiliating memories of "Reconstruction," real or fantasied, took revenge upon the hapless Negroes. They were given approval by President Coolidge and further impetus by Woodrow Wilson who fired Negro civil servants at Washington and segregated the few remaining messengers, janitors, etc.

In short, Naval officers took their cues from the top--their Commanders-in-Chief. Ranking negro petty officers were beached after WWI to await the attrition of retirement and incoming negroes who fought in WWI were restricted to the Stewards branch (10,000 served).

Blatant discrimination was practiced against Negro servicemen as a matter of policy and tended to pick up impetus in the aftermath of WWI as did lynchings and other hate parameters in the U. S., though Negro servicemen served with distinction in France. The head of Sea Service, Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, was not a friend of the Negro. The Navy stopped taking Negroes as stewards in 1932 and only resumed enlistments when it became evident that there were not enough Filipinos and Guamanians to man the two-ocean Navy, projected on the eve of WWII. A trickle of Negroes was allowed again in 1934.

This writer entered the Navy in the first large contingent of Negroes to enlist after the ban was lifted (1939-40). Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, a Tennessean, was explicit in his determination that Negroes be restricted to the Stewards branch (servants) along with orientals (Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, Guamanians and dark Puerto Ricans). However, the advent of WWII (7 Dec 1941) set in motion with dramatic suddenness, forces that surfaced the issue of discrimination in the armed forces. According to John Hope Franklin, "Approximately five million whites were still unemployed in 1940"²--the tail end of the long depression of the 1930's, when the U. S. activated the defense industry to manufacture war weapons. Whites were hired first and Negroes were given only what whites abandoned or didn't want (janitorial, etc.). The Negro leadership viewed this with both anger and alarm:

In January 1941, A. Phillip Randolph, the President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, advanced the idea of 100,000 Negroes marching on Washington... By June, Negroes all over the United States... were

²Ibid. p. 577-578.

making preparations to entrain for Washington. During the last three weeks of June 1941 many things were done to prevent the march on Washington."

According to Lerone Bennet: "Asa Phillip Randolph is one of the most remarkable Negro leaders in American history. His march on Washington gambit was certainly one of the most brilliant power plays ever executed by a U. S. Negro leader,"³ Randolph had been jailed in WWI for speaking out against Negro participation and had fought the railroads to a finish, earning the right to form the International Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. He was summoned to New York City Hall in WWII where Fiorello La Guardia, Mayor of New York and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt attempted to talk him out of marching on Washington but to no avail. At this point Franklin D. Roosevelt summoned Randolph and two of his most powerful supporters, Walter White (NAACP) and T. Arnold Hill of the Urban League to Washington, according to Bennet:

"President Roosevelt sat behind his desk flanked by the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of War. He was cordial but cautious. He challenged the right of the group to put pressure on the White House. He was doing the best he could and he intended to do more, but there must be no pressure; the march on Washington must be called off."⁴

According to this eye witness account Randolph stood stubbornly on his grounds and told the President that "Something had to be done and now!" Perhaps it is this that accounts for Bennets label--"most unique black leader." He was facing probably the most powerful and versatile politician America ever produced, a man known to reward his friends and ruthlessly crush his enemies. But also probably one of the greatest students of men that ever lived. Though Roosevelt bristled for a moment he is said to have smiled and turned on his immense charm, looked to Walter White of the NAACP, whom he knew and trusted and asked if

³Bennet, Lerone, Before the Mayflower, Baltimore, Maryland, 1966. Penguin Books, p. 304-305.

⁴Ibid.

Randolph was bluffing and how many Negroes were really prepared to descend on Washington, to which White replied 50,000 to 100,000. He then turned to Randolph and asked, "What do you want?" Randolph told him that an end to discrimination in war industries and the armed forces was a minimum that he would settle for. On June 25th, 1941 the President issued his famous Executive Order #8802 in which he said that "there shall be no discrimination in the employment in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color or national origin... and it is the duty of employees and labor organizations to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers."⁵

President Roosevelt's keen, analytical mind and his pragmatic action stayed the march on Washington until the coming of the Negro revolt in the 1960's. Though Martin Luther King did the talking, Asa Phillip Randolph was there, old and ramrod straight. Not 50,000 but 250,000 persons did march-- they represented white and black, Jew and Gentile and most ethnic groups. That they had to march forms the basic reason why the military has a problem. After #8802 was issued 3,000,000 Negroes registered for Selective Service and approximately 1,000,000 served. According to Franklin, 701,678 served in the Army, 165,000 served in the Navy, 17,000 served in the Marines and 5,000 in the U. S. Coast Guard.⁶ The black race did not welch on its agreement. With the tales of horror of the "Red Summer" of 1919 in the aftermath of WWI told to them by their fathers and grandfathers of Negro soldiers lynched while still in their uniforms still fresh in their memories, Negroes rose to the task of defending the country. Roosevelt's orders were not obeyed. Instead, by "Gentlemen's Agreement," white America retarded the effort and frustrated the Negro. The result for the Navy was the first mutiny since 1842 and the destruction of the seaward side of the Naval Magazine at Port Chicago, California, 17 July 1944,

⁵Franklin, John Hope, From Slavery to Freedom, New York, 1969, p. 529, Random House.

⁶Ibid.

which killed 250 Negroes, crippled the Pacific Fleet munitions effort and caused the first mutiny in the Navy since the Somers mutiny of 1842. This was due to Negro sailors being relegated to labor battalions instead of receiving equal assignments at sea which destroyed their morale--they became careless with ammunition. Negro servicemen dissipated massive energy fighting segregation and discrimination. So thorough was discrimination practiced that the only medals won were by mess boys. This persisted between WWII and Korea. On the eve of the Korean War, A. Phillip Randolph was back in the fray! In an appearance before a Senate Committee on 31 March 1948, he informed the group that unless equality of treatment was forthcoming he would lead a massive boycott urging Negro youth to refuse induction under the Selective Service act. Later that year white barbers at the U. S. Naval Base in Charleston, South Carolina refused to cut Negro sailor's hair. President Harry Truman issued orders to the Navy telling the Commanding officer to "fire them" if they refused to cut any sailors hair. Truman, on 26 July 1948, issued Executive Order #9981 directing "equality of treatment and opportunity."⁷ The Navy moved on this order and even moved toward desegregating the Stewards branch, traditionally the preserve of Orientals, Guamanians and Negroes. In 1949 Wesley A. Brown was graduated as the first Negro officer to complete studies at Annapolis (Negro officers in WWII were trained at Great Lakes, Illinois). The Army winked at the order to the extent that the 24th Infantry Regiment, based in Japan, remained segregated and all black until the Korean War. This Regiment was rushed to Korea after Communist North Koreans flooded across the 38th parallel and pushed illy trained U. S. troops back. The 24th after a 16 hour battle won the first victory of the Korean War on 21 July 1950 at Yechon. The 24th helped stabilize the American battle line, fought with conspicuous gallantry, then died a moral death.

⁷Bennet, Lerone, Before the Mayflower (see Landmarks and Milestones) p. 198.

The 24th became unreliable in the field. According to an article, Walton H. Walker, Commanding General in Korea was in the process of disbanding this Regiment that had lost its soul and will to fight. But Walker was killed in an accident before he could act. General Maxwell D. Taylor who relieved Walker, carried out Executive order 9981, desegregated the 24th and posted its Negro soldiers to white units. By dispersing these troops in white units, Taylor carried out the final act of administrative desegregation of the Armed forces. These men's fighting capacity was restored and many went on to serve with distinction.

This paper is essentially Navy. Yet we form a social system and the effects upon one unit cannot help but affect other components--in this instance all Negroes in the services. It is for this reason some Army incidents are included. Though Taylor did administratively end desegregation, ending the virulent strain of racism in American life was beyond his capacity. Further, the emergence of the "Negro Revolt," in the decades 1954 (Brown vs The Board of Education) and 1974 (Watergate) placed a new force in the field of U. S. Race Relations. The "glad to be heah"-type bourgeoisie oreo-type Negro is becoming extinct and the Sambo, yassuh boss-type Nigger has nearly vanished as a breed. The semantic word Negro is suspect and on the way out--being replaced by Black and proud. In short the Negro race in the United States is in the process of redefining itself and shedding the deleterious effects of being defined by white America. There is a definite movement, psychologically, from the negative, humiliating term "Negro" to the more positive term "Black" in the Black world.

The two most potent terms in the Black segment of U. S. society today are those of "Black Identity" and "Black Dignity." The Communist party received its worst beating outside Russia at the hands of American Negroes because they failed to deal with and understand the latency and need implied by these two

terms. In recent history the Symbionese Liberation Army, officered in the main by white middle-class radicals failed to acquire support from the Black community because it failed to appreciate the underlying import of these some two terms. The U. S. Army and U. S. Marines suffered serious racial disturbances during the Vietnam War for the same reasons. Finally, as Vietnam wore on the Navy got its lumps in form of riots and strike and mutiny on the major fleet units, USS Kittyhawk and USS Constellation, 85,000 ton aircraft carriers.

Other forces as counterfailing mechanisms retarding positive Black responses to desegregation of the Armed forces and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

My student officers are possibly more frustrated and angered more by the lack of positive response on part of young Blacks than by any other factors implied by functional Human Resources Management. Their frustration and anger is understandable. It is painful and frustrating to remain cool while attempting to assist Blacks while concomitantly having to deal with "Black rejection"--a new twist as whites traditionally rejected Blacks--being referred to as a turkey/honkey! This is made more painful when orders from above stipulate integrating these same seemingly abrasive Black youngsters and other minorities into fighting units as a focus of current Navy policy and the presence in the fitness report of a new block for measuring one's ability to do so. Further, I find most of my white students as "culturally deprived" as the Blacks and in many instances more so. One can stand frustration and probably stay the surge of anger if informed on the locus and reasons for the behavior of the antagonist. This knowledge could possibly move a person from the vulnerable leadership position of reaction to the more formidable position of proaction.

For sake of clarification lets look at some probable causes of negative Black responses to Human Goals efforts on part of white officers and the services:

1. Most white officers are culturally deprived in that most were fed a pabulum-type of history that ignored the Negro in most instances and usually omitted the negative aspects of the Black experience in the U.S.
2. Black history was lost, stolen or allowed to stray (according to Bill Cosby's TV narrative) to the extent that most Negroes (they became Black later) instead of learning and integrating their own history in the full Century 1863 (Emancipation proclamation) to 1963 (the Negro Centennial of Emancipation) most Negroes under the impetus of the Negro Revolt have had their history, all 300 years of it, dumped into their consciousness in two decades 1954-1974--a short time in which to silently philosophically debate and integrate the life time experiences of a people.
3. The result has been one of shock born of too rapid an ingestion and a sense of anger and betrayal by white America due to real knowledge of the sustained brutally cruel assault promulgated upon Negro-Americans and implied by the Black Experience in the U.S. The young Negro learns via this media also, how faithfully Blacks contributed to this country's growth and died in its wars which makes them ashamed that their forbears didn't demand more dignity as human beings and men for that loyalty.
4. The foregoing is a painful knowledge that has caused Black America to engage in a massive quest for a new positive Black Identity that has no place for "Uncle Tom or Sambo." Most white officers tend to possess little knowledge of what is implied socially or psychologically by the human redefinition as imposed by the socio-political storm unleashed in the two decades mentioned. Shocked by the violence done to their perceptions of what formerly was expectations of Negro behavior (Negro submissiveness) many can only perceive emergent Black behavior as threatening acts of ungratefulness.

5. The act of redefining one's self is fraught with psychic pain, frustration and anger. When whites fail to understand the developmental process in which the Black is engaged (becoming a self-respecting person) the vicious cycle occurs. The behavior of the white is interpreted by young Blacks struggling with the task of identity as "Those honkies don't want me to become a person with a right to dignity and self respect." This phenomena and its implied Black/White misunderstanding constitutes the material of which race riots are made.

The Contemporary Historical Sources of the Negative Image of Naval Service in the Black Community.

Down the American continuum of recent U. S. history a series of incidents stamped, almost indelibly on the consciousness of Black America, a negative image of U. S. Naval service. The effect upon the life and morale of those Blacks who served was at once energy draining and humiliating; an egregious existence at best. Unwanted by whites and sneered at by Negroes, Navy Stewards lived amidst a constant assault upon their morale and often their persons. As an example this writer, as a Navy Steward in the 1940's, was assaulted and contemptuously treated by Blacks, out of ignorance, and whites due to racial malice and hatred. Consequently, we fought three wars, not one. We fought America's enemies at sea, red necks on the docks and ignorant angry Negro brothers in the ghetto. That the negative image has not dissipated completely can be drawn from this account by a white recruiter in North Carolina recently. This officer student of mine was attempting to recruit a bright Black youngster who seemed anxious to sign but evaded the final recruitment process. Finally the mystery was cleared up when the youth arrived escorted by his aged aunt who demanded "Is you white folks trying to make a cook out of my boy?" This

recruiter had quite a time convincing this dowager that Blacks were no longer recruited as servants only. She remembered the Navy-created race riot in Washington, D. C. in WWI and the bad publicity about the Navy on the eve of WWII over this issue.

In order to ascertain why Naval policy discrimination has seemed to stick in Black consciousness longer than the Army who has had far more incidents, let's look at a few incidents, as negative image makers.

1. Negroes were reduced to servants in WWI and the 10,000 who were recruited served as Stewards and Cooks.
2. During the bloody "Red Summer" of 1919 in the aftermath of WWI, whereby white America sought to put "uppity Niggers" who served in France back in their traditional places, bloody riots occurred at Houston, Texas in September 1917 where the 24th Infantry (all Negro and the same one that died in Korea in later years) after much mistreatment, demanded an end to harrassment by local white toughs. White officers answered by disarming the regiment. Under further provocation Black soldiers seized arms and killed 17 whites. "With only slight pretense of a trial 13 Negro soldiers were hanged for murder and mutiny, 41 were imprisoned for life and 40 others were held for investigation."⁸ This was brutal era for Negroes in the civilian sector. There were 19 verifiable lynchings and 12 probables in the state of Virginia in 1918 according to the NAACP.⁹

Riots occurred at Longview, Texas; Knoxville, Tennessee; East St. Louis, Illinois; Chicago, Illinois; Omaha, Nebraska; Phillips County, Arkansas (city of Elaine) and Washington, D. C. Lynching spiraled in the southwest and midwest

⁸Franklin, John Hope, p. 460. See also the NAACP by C. F. Kellog, pp. 209-246, for more detailed account of the climate in this era.

⁹Waskow, Arthur, I., From Race-Riot to Sit-In: 1919 and the 1960's, Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966, p. 22.

especially in Nebraska, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and the Carolinas. The race riot during the Red Summer of 1919 that drew most national attention and placed the Navy in an extremely bad image position occurred in Washington, D. C., the nation's capitol. Southern whites poured into Washington in WWI. A lesser amount of southern Negroes migrated also. President Woodrow Wilson's southern oriented policy had displaced many Negroes in Civil Service. These Negroes went to work in war industries and many got salaries over the white civil servants. According to Arthur I. Waskow, the southern migrants were focused upon "Teaching any fresh nigger his place." The Negroes were "determined to be free or win revenge. This exacerbated racial tensions within the city." The Negroes sense of independence was strengthened by their service in France during the war.¹⁰ The stage was set. Negroes were made "pawns" in a power struggle between two powerful white men at Washington, Ned McLean, publisher of the Washington Post and Major Raymond W. Pellman, Chief of Police. Waskow, in his report on the causes of the riot states that:

"The Washington Post, then published by Ned McLean, was bitterly antagonistic to the District of Columbia government and especially to the top command of the police force. McLean especially objected to tough police enforcement of prohibition. He began hounding the police through his newspaper and in the summer of 1919 began to criticize them for not controlling a crime wave of assaults and robberies. The Post kept the idea of a crime wave alive by sensationalizing the usual summer crime statistics and playing up ordinary cases of assault. Prominent among these were alleged instances of attempts by Negroes to rape white women."¹¹

According to Waskow, on 9 July the Washington Branch of the NAACP sent a letter to all four daily newspapers in Washington calling their attention to the fact

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid. pp.22-23 (underlining of prohibition was done by this author).

that they were sowing the seeds of a race riot by their inflammatory headlines. Only one newspaper answered--the Star--and acknowledged the justice of the complaint. The next day however, the Times printed a news story emphasizing the NAACP's interest in bringing to justice all Negroes accused of crime, and leaving out its criticism of the tendency of the press to identify particular Negro criminals with the entire Negro race."¹²

As the tension continued to rise, people were arrested, mostly Negroes, in some alleged rape attempt cases only to be released for lack of evidence. McLean attacked the police for laxity in doing their job. This is probably the source of the blackest mark that history records on the Washington Post's record. (It was this paper that recently exposed the Watergate break in.) It was placed there on 19 July 1919. This involved a shaky case of alleged assault which the Post printed in bold black headlines--NEGROES ATTACK GIRL...WHITE MEN VAINLY PURSUE. The body of the story described an attack in which two negroes jostled a secretary on her way home, tried to seize her umbrella and frightened at her resistance to their insulting actions fled... The incident reported in the Post on Saturday morning bore deadly fruit on Saturday night. The girl attacked was the wife of a man in Naval aviation.

According to Waskow, John Hope Franklin and also the NAACP, a mob of sailors and Marines in excess of 200 decided to avenge the slight to his and their honor by lynching the two Negroes suspected of the attack but released by the police, probably due to insufficient evidence. The sailor and Marine mob marched into southwest Washington (heavily populated by Negroes) beating every Negro they found in the street--men and women. A riot squad finally dispersed the mob. Two white Navy men were arrested and eight Negroes were also arrested and held for investigation--Negroes were arrested for being caught and assaulted! A howl went through the Negro community. Waskow says

¹²Ibid (for a full report see pp. 21-37. See also Franklin's report p. 481.

that... "Although the eight to two arrest rate might be imagined to have indicated a higher rate of law breaking by Negroes, it is hard to avoid concluding that the unneutral behavior of the police had much to do with the Negro attack on them and with the later increase in violence from both Negroes and whites,"¹³ The Negro Community armed themselves for the certain rise in violence to come on the next day.

On Sunday morning the NAACP got in touch with Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, and entreated him to restrain his Marines and sailors. He could have done so with a simple order restricting all sea services personnel to their bases. Though Daniels was warned of more serious clashes by NAACP officials he took no action, according to his diary he felt that Negroes were at fault anyway. Instead of the Washington Post tempering its inflammatory statements McLean behaved like a "bullgoose-loony." Negroes and whites fought all over Washington commencing at 10:00 pm until the wee hours of the morning. Negroes, though vastly outnumbered fought back when a mob of sailors and Marines marched up Pennsylvania Avenue beating Negroes. The riot flared outward from Pennsylvania Avenue, over down town Washington where armed Negroes shot it out with policemen, soldiers, Marines, sailors and civilians. On Monday morning McLean in reporting Sunday night's violence probably committed the most irresponsible act of any major newspaper in the journalistic history of this country, by adding the following paragraph:

"It was learned that a mobilization of every available serviceman stationed in or near Washington or on leave here has been ordered for tomorrow evening near the Knights of Columbus hut on Pennsylvania Avenue between 7th and 8th Streets. The hour of assembly is at 9 o'clock and the purpose is a "clean-up" that will cause the events of the last two evenings to pale into insignificance."¹⁴

¹³Ibid. p. 24.

¹⁴Ibid. p. 25.

A stunned Negro community and finally an angered group of District officials condemned the Post for this act. Though the act itself went far past "yellow journalism" into the sphere of criminality, as no military orders had been issued, McLean was never brought to trial. The rest is history. Negroes organized and not only fought back but attacked. They used cars full of armed men to carry out "lightning type raids" into white districts--armored cavalry tactics were used. They stoned streetcars and autos, engaged in running gun battles with white armed cars and one gang of Negroes were dispersed just before it reached the gates of Washington Navy yard.

One faction wanted the President to declare Martial Law. District Commissioners turned this down, probably sensing possibilities of a "blood bath." The ultra conservative George Washington Post of the American Legion many of whom knew Negro soldiers who fought in France came out with a condemnation of sailors and Marines being allowed to degenerate into mobs who attacked Americans. A Florida congressman said that failure to apprehend Negro assailants of white women caused the riot. A New York congressman demanded that the Army Navy and Marine Corps restrain their men from mob participation and was assured this would be done by high-ranking officers. Herbert J. Seligman of NAACP's National office in New York came in on a fact finding mission and condemned both the armed forces and the police department. He demanded that the War and Navy Departments take action.

Under widespread pressure from the same element in Congress and the District, Wilson called in the then Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, Secretary of the Navy, Daniels, General Peyton, March, U. S. Army Chief of Staff and the police chief. These were ordered to bring in additional troops from Fort Mead, Maryland, Quantico, Virginia, and sailors from two ships lying at anchor in the Potomac River. All were placed under General William G. Haan who ordered

troops into all Washington areas. Haan also talked with New York area commanders about more troops. Mounted cavalry charged about the streets, on call at any information concerning hot spots. By Monday night 2000 Federal troops plus 600 Washington policemen were on duty. All were admonished to enforce the law equally. Policemen had lost credibility. The neutrality of Federal troops backed by a driving rain prevented further bloodshed and stopped the riot.

This was not the only incident during the Red Summer of 1919 that involved U. S. Navy sailors. The participation of sailors in the Chicago riot involved servicemen stationed at Great Lakes Naval Training Station. Their beating, injuring and killing Negroes caught in the down town Loop in the Chicago riot was given wide publicity by the Chicago Defender, the most widely read Negro newspaper in the country's Negro community with the possible exception of the Pittsburg Courier. Ironically, the only city in the United States that administered justice equally and protected Negro citizens and whites alike was Charleston, South Carolina. Of the alleged 25 riots during the Red Summer of 1919 one must really understand the real anatomy of the Semantic term riot. Looking closely many of these were "expanded lynchings." Charleston, South Carolina and Longview, Texas were the first two real riots to erupt on the national consciousness. They were different in that local people fought each other at Longview--they merely happened to be black and white. At Charleston, literally a foreign element, in the form of out of town servicemen, sailors from the Charleston Naval base triggered violence with the city's Negro citizens.

In 1919 Charleston had approximately 100,000 people of which 60% were Negroes, many with meaningful relationships with whites that dated from the Civil War. This probably accounts for Charleston's unique capacity to deal

effectively with the riot. Policemen were not partial to whites and the Military Commander took decisive action. Arthur Waskow says:

"The outbreak began in the evening of 10 May 1919 with a streetcar altercation between a Negro and two sailors on Saturday night liberty. The Negro was shot and killed and a series of fights broke out between other Negroes and sailors, with guns and clubs being used on both sides. Charleston police arrested the sailors who fired first and attempted to clear the streets. But sporadic fighting spread, hundreds of sailors joined in a march toward the Negro district of Charleston. They captured, beat and shot several Negroes along their route, looted shooting galleries for rifles and ammunition and attacked stores owned by Negroes."¹⁵

At this point police, realizing that they had lost control called the Commanding officer of the Navy base. Around midnight according to Waskow, "Marines arrived to act as patrolmen and were armed with riot guns to hold back the mob. Fixed bayonets proved sufficient, however, to stop the sailors march. Marines ordered all sailors back to the Navy Yard and trucks, streetcars and taxi cabs were used to send them back to their bases and ships. Negroes began sniping at returning sailors, and police and Marines ordered all Negroes off the streets."¹⁶

Unlike the indecisive racist oriented dilly-dallying at Washington, D. C., senior Naval officers moved quickly to head off any acts that might exacerbate the violence. All sailors liberties were cancelled. The Mayor of Charleston also rose to new heights for an American official of this era. Where officials at Milwaukee, Wisconsin allowed two Negroes to be hung by a mob to lamp posts and those in Wyoming, Pennsylvania and the rest of the south

¹⁵Ibid. p. 13.

¹⁶Ibid. p. 13.

wallowed in timid indecision the Mayor of Charleston told the city in no uncertain terms that he would declare Martial Law and that aggressors of any color would be punished. He also urged the Navy to compensate those Negro businessmen whose stores were looted or damaged by sailors. A coroners jury convened several days later and placed the blame on the sailors and exonerated the Negroes who fought back in self-defense, an unheard of thing in this era. Pushed by the NAACP the Navy Department ordered an investigation. The U. S. Naval Board of Inquiry ordered arrested a number of sailors, as instigators of the riot. Six were given General Court Martials, the charges being Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline and Manslaughter. All were convicted.

The Charleston incident is what has caused me to rely so heavily on Arthur I. Waskow's book. This positive action by the Navy is not mentioned in the Negro Reference Book, nor Myrdal's classic, An American Dilemma. Nor does either the authoritative works by Lerone Bennet and John Hope Franklin give but salutary note of the incident. Neither does John D. Hicks, Richard Hofstadter, Henry Steele Commages and Samuel Elliot Morrison (the latter are Pulitzer prize winners) give any semblance of the importance of this incident. It appears that modern Black historians and white ones are grossly guilty of errors of omission which has contributed to the cultural deprivation of Blacks and whites alike. At a time when the Armed Forces needs any and all positive historical image media available, perhaps historians should look for these tidbits in their dusty bins and forgotten journals.

Another serious error made today by Human Resources Managers rests in the fact that many find the odium of young Blacks as pertains to the "real history" of this country, as opposed to the "pabulum histroy" which they were taught, too painful to deal with. In response they engage in two forms of behaviors, both doomed to failure on the basis of unreality. The first group includes many of my students (these usually recant on becoming better informed)

who say, "That's irrelevant; what's past is past." On close questioning my students become defensive and say, "I'm interested in today, not yesterday, I never enslaved or lynched any Negroes." What they are really saying is, "I wish that this part of American history would go away." It is not what is said that alarms me, as an instructor and former enlisted man, it is what is left unsaid that contains reactive rather than proactive content. What is left unsaid is, "Why don't Negroes stop yelling about being Black and assume the former humiliating, obsequious stance in the Negro-White relationship and there won't be any problems." Tragically this silent assumption of Negro willingness to do so seldom weighs the cost to the young Black of stepping backward into his former historical Uncle Tom/Sambo role, which I doubt he will ever again do. Nor does it weigh the cost to fighting units of having personnel with little or no morale for serious leaders to tap. If the young Black of military age learned anything from the "Negro Revolt" it was that bootlicking, cringing behavior never dignified any of his ancestors! Consequently he is not about assuming the former behavior of his forbears. This group reacting to their discomfort tends to blame the victim rather than the oppressive forces creating the problem.

The second group tends to engage in the pseudo-liberal action of ultra-understanding. This group instead of seeking out historical incidents like that at Charleston, often unwittingly aids and abets the negative behavior of the young Black in the throes of the Black Identity crisis and though well-meaning, assists him toward self-destruction of his Naval career and his psychological development effort which causes him to be discharged as unfit, to become another bitter criminal element in the nations ghettos. Unfortunately, one cannot "leap pages" of history or wish them away as if it did not happen. That this was attempted has created the negative force in Black-White relations.

What is needed is not "White guilt" or "Black animosity" and implacability but sound programs aimed at dealing with problems rather than symptoms so that we may get on with the serious business of defending this Country. When one adds to the Navy's negative incidents, the "Port Chicago Mutiny" and others known to this writer that occurred in WWII ~~and~~^{which} are secreted in dusty reports in Naval archives one should be gratified that White men and Black men dare to trust or respect each other or that Kittyhawk and Constellation was so long in erupting and spotlighting the need for serious consideration in this area.

It is a fact of history that of the seven major race riots and eighteen minor ones in 1919, the U. S. Navy's sailors triggered two of the most publicized and were highly visible in another. Further the Navy was the most vulnerable of the major services race-relations-wise on the eve of WWII and was made a focus of assault by the Negro Press. There is scarcely a Black family in the U. S. in which the grandfather, father or older aunts or uncles do not have stored away in their black consciousness something negative that they often read in the Negro papers about the Navy. It is these that Navy recruiters must convince in order to compete successfully for the cream of young Black recruits.

One other item and we can move on to actual programming and its processes. This is probably the brightest, best informed group of young people the U. S. has ever produced. I do not mean that there are large amounts of wisdom, this comes with age in most instances. They are also the most cynical. Unlike my generation, who had to depend on radio (audio), these youngsters had the boob-tube (TV). They saw the turbulent decades (1954-1974) unfold in all of the violence, heart break and broken promises. As further countervailing forces impinging upon recruitment, retention and service morale, they have witnessed Vietnam and Watergate which, in a great measure, has validated their

mistrust and cynicism. Elders and leaders have suffered severe loss of prestige and credibility. William Ryan has said:

"Despite years of marches, commissions, judicial decisions, and endless legislative remedies, we are confronted with unchanging or even widening racial differences in achievement."¹⁷

The net effect that this has, not on the Black alone, but other awakening minorities and young whites as well (Indians, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans and Orientals) is that of being pushed, insidiously further into a state of Anomie¹⁸ (normlessness) as their lifegoals seem to recede instead of drawing nearer. The Navy, in particular, and every American should be grateful that the service and the country spawned an Admiral capable of seeing this dangerous problem. Admiral Zumwalt not only correctly analyzed the problem, he exhibited the courage, toughness and intellect necessary to set in motion programs capable of movement toward solution--an act that had been avoided or "played with" by other CNO's for 54 years.

As a Black mess boy and later Master Chief Steward, and still later a Community Organization Specialist and teacher let me say that for the first time in my 35 years of connection with the Navy, that I am finally allowed to be genuinely proud of my service--something denied me for the 21 years that I served. For a cynical, militant Black such as this writer, to be moved to admiration by a Navy Human Resources Management program, after witnessing the failure of Presidents Roosevelt's and Truman's attempts at integration fail, required this program to undergo detailed scrutiny.

¹⁷Ryan, William, Blaming the Victim, New York, 1971, Vintage Books. (The author has intentionally left pages out of footnote. He feels that all Americans should read the book.)

¹⁸Merton, Robert K., Social Structure and Anomie, Bobbs Merrill Pamphlet Series.

In a recent survey of attitudes towards the armed forces branches, Black Americans perceived the U.S. Navy as the most discriminatory and racist of all branches (Army, Airforce, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard). I am certain that this program, if its present design is carried out, will dissipate any lingering negative image. It is hoped that this brief historical monograph will assist serious military leaders in:

1. Understanding some of the root causes of racial and ethnic problems confronting today's naval leaders.
2. Enabling leaders to deal positively with their own frustrations (legitimate) at the seeming slowness of the responses of U.S. minorities to the current Human Resources Management effort now in progress in the Navy.
3. Realizing that Human Resources Management knowledge and program evolutions, as instruments for building moral and group cohesion, are as important to combat readiness (a ship is as good as the crew who man her), as those involving engineering, ordnance, etc.
4. The importance of positive Human Resources Management programs in creating a climate within the commands in the Navy capable of attracting and re-taining the increasingly scarce young men and women of the calibre needed to man modern naval combat units.

The last statement (4) is in its first critical stages now!

The two Rs, Recruitment and Retention will, from the best available forecasts, become ultracritical in the 1980's due to an extreme scarcity of military age-bracket young people in the United States (the trend is toward smaller families). That branch of service which fails to do its HRM homework in the lead time afforded by the less than three remaining years of the 1970's will, in the greater degree of probability, find itself badly incapacitated as a competitor for scarce recruits in the 1980's. There is certain to ensue a "war of all against all" among the services for these eligibles. Further,

poor recruitment and retention efforts by a service is almost certain to cause the service involved to experience the most "negative scrutiny" of congressional appropriation committees. Adding validity to this assertion are certain economic and sociopolitical facts. For examples:

1. Manpower and military retirements benefits have surpassed "hardware" (planes, ships, tanks, weapons systems, facilities, etc.) in cost to the extent that these are taking 55% of the U.S. defense dollar. Congress has been forced to look more closely at military expenditures.
2. Quantitatively: Failure to acquire enough recruits results in overwork of crews and undermanning of ships and plane squadrons, resulting in bad command climate, lowered retention rates, and spiraling manpower costs. Qualitatively: The complexity of current military hardware demands a certain percentage of the cream of the recruitment pool available. Positive command climate and fairness of treatment will probably be a major determinant of the Navy's ability to attract and retain its share of this type of recruit.
3. The services' human relations problems are not any longer centered in the basically clear-cut Black/white sphere of issues. Human relations has become multidimensional and increased in both importance and complexity and now goes beyond Black and white into sex, new life styles, drug and alcohol abuse, etc.
4. The services as a result of the long, unpopular, costly war in Vietnam, have acquired positions of "high social and political visibility," and consequently more intense "news worthiness" along with current "anti-military" sentiment in the broader society. It logically follows that the service which fails at positive management of its human resources concomitantly increases its vulnerability in areas encompassing damage to image, loss of broad-based public and political support, adequate

appropriations needed for combat readiness and capacity to recruit and retain top personnel.

If the foregoing is really grasped with clarity, it should also logically follow why the U.S. Navy is in the human resources management business. For sake of further clarity, I address this to those officers, warrant officers, chiefs, and petty officers who for personal reasons born of brittleness or prejudices have failed to "buy in" to these programs: "Try it; you might like it." Many of you are very skilled and committed people. It would be a tragedy for both your service and yourselves, as well as your country, if you fail to exhibit the capacity to participate intelligently in this critically needed program.

Before moving on to Part II and the program process section, allow me to state a simple but relevant reality: "The Navy is not spending money and time on this massive effort in order to play 'Big Daddy' or make social workers or 'bleeding hearts' of its leaders." Naval leaders are intelligently directing the service in the areas of change necessary for its survival as a decent and fair place for all servicemen and women in order to remain a viable force in defense of this country. This generation of naval leaders may have surpassed all of the other services in designing and implementing "people programs." The promulgation of such programs rests on your shoulders. You have the bone. If you are a committed professional, all that is needed is that you take it in your teeth and run with it. Probably one of the great reservoirs of fighting men left untapped in this country resides in its ghettos, barrios, on the Indian reservations, in Appalachia and the rural areas of the South and Midwest. It is time that we see these Americans as assets rather than liabilities. These people did not run off to Canada to avoid the draft when their country called them. Human Resources Management programs insure that these people who were formerly rejected in peacetime but sought after in war receive the fair treatment accorded all Americans.

THE U. S. NAVY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM:
INITIAL AND CURRENT EFFORTS

PART II

The U. S. Navy seems to have a head start on the other services in the area of human resources management as its current program probably comes nearer to meeting the criteria of the organizational development process than other services. The foregoing chapter attempted to bring the persons up-to-date who may not have been familiar with the historical and socio-political events underlying the present HRM effort. This is based upon the very real assertion, "If an organization doesn't know where it came from, it will probably experience problems in ascertaining where it is going."

Prelude to Kittyhawk/Constellation Racial Incidents.

Contrary to press reports and subsequent hearings implying neglect and permissiveness in this area, the Navy possessed a myriad of programs whose focus was on equal opportunity and race relations long before the shipboard blow-ups that caused the nation to focus on these problems. As an example, the Kittyhawk incident did not occur until 12 October 1972 and the Constellation incident did not come to public notice until November of that year. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird held meetings based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the subsequent additions to that act implied in the Civil Rights Act of 1968. He asked for and got the approval and signatures of all of the Secretaries of branches of service on the document entitled HUMAN GOALS CREDO 18 August 1969, three years before the Kittyhawk/Constellation incidents, Secretary of the Navy John Chaffee issued through his Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, James D. Hittle, SECNAVINST 5350.6A, superceding SECNAVINSTS 5350.1, 5350.2A and 5350.6. He thus consolidated the myriad of fragmentary directives and issued a codified set of guide lines for the Navy Equal Opportunity

effort at the policy level. In this document the Secretary delineated policy, objectives, goals, and the responsibilities of commanding officers and methods of processing complaints. In reminding commanding officers of the fact that, directives, as such, were incapable of insuring equal treatment the Secretary cited the fact that President Truman had issued Executive Order #8891 in July 1948. His implication was clear as the problem of inequality was still around.

Though Chaffee placed the awesome responsibility for equal treatment of service personnel squarely upon the shoulders of commanding officers he also gave them the clout needed to deal decisively with external countervailing forces (such as housing and public places who discriminated against Navy men) that were formerly beyond their authority--power to act against other institutions in the broader social environment beyond the borders of Naval installations! Chapter two of SECNAVINST 5350.6A, dealing with off limits sanctions implied that a commanding officer required "Secretarial Approval" in order to exercise off-limits powers as sanction in cases of racial discrimination. This effectively tied a commanding officer's hands. On 27 May 1971 the Secretary issued ALNAV 27/71 which stated:

1. Cancel that portion of paragraph #207 Ref. A which implies a requirement for secretarial approval for use of off-limits sanctions in cases of racial discrimination. Local commanders both overseas and in the United States are hereby delegated authority and responsibility to impose off-limits sanctions in appropriate cases of racial discrimination as they do in cases of vice, brawling, unsanitary conditions and the like after all other reasonable efforts have proved unavailing.
2. Local procedures for imposition of off-limits sanctions in such cases should parallel those used for other off-limits declarations.

It is a fact that contrary to adverse press reports those officials charged with the formulation of Naval policy had, long before the Kittyhawk and Constellation incidents, moved positively in their efforts to secure for each member of the Navy Equal Opportunity as pertains to fair treatment, assignment and promotion.

On the military side the same applies if we look closely at Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt's tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations. Here we find intense civil strife in the broader society, but no lack of action aimed at countering the adverse effects upon the Navy. Elmo R. Zumwalt, as CNO, was a "stormy petrel" in a traditionally conservative position. This probably intensified his "newsworthy appeal." Though he was, possibly, the most controversial Admiral to ever head the Sea Services he did exhibit the daring and courage needed for the times. In moving on the race relations area of Human Goals he tackled a problem that had been carefully avoided by CNO's since 1919. Admiral Zumwalt, in a speech at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1974, after his retirement, admitted that some mistakes were made in trying to implement the Human Goals programs. To a question posed by a student "If you had to do it again would you still have proceeded as you did?" Zumwalt replied, "Yes, one must start somewhere. I would, however, do a better job of tooling up (training people and testing program impact) before actually implementing programs." In issuing Z-Gram #66 in December 1970, all commanding officers were so informed of the CNO's aims and goals--the eradication of discrimination in Navy life. This was followed in August by Z-Gram #14 and in September Z-Gram #24. (Note: fiscal rather than regular calendar dates probably accounts for 66 appearing before 14 and 24.) In January 1971 he established a Multi-Racial Advisory Council for Race Relations and Minority Affairs to develop and monitor policies and programs.¹ Prior to the Kittyhawk/Constellation incidents

¹See NAVOP-R31221/040 July 72 (Paragraph 3).

there were more than two-hundred² programs aimed at eradicating racism, improving Navy life for all personnel and upgrading performance. It is pertinent to again point out that most of these programs were formulated and in various stages of implementation long before the adverse incidents of 12 October 1972 (Kittyhawk) and November 1972 (Constellation). It would appear that the press made gross errors by inferring that top policy makers had dragged their feet in attempting to deal with the race-relations problem. Did Line Commanders drag their feet? Were they incapacitated by negative racial feelings? Were they incapacitated by lack of skills in this area of leadership or did they suffer a "functional fixity" and tremble before the massiveness of the problem? These questions and a myriad of others must await analysis by Naval historians.

After the Kittyhawk and Constellation hit the news media in October, it is a matter of record that all ranking Admirals in the Washington area, charged with executing policy, were assembled by Admiral Zumwalt and "raked over the coals." Zumwalt, in so many words, told them that programs did not fail, men did. He told this group that equal meant just that--equal. At this dressing down, the CNO said:

"... The time has come for me to speak very plainly, to speak without the usual cushions of jargon and without the exquisite politeness we sometimes use to mask the impact of our thoughts... The Navy has made unacceptable progress in the equal opportunity area, and the failure was not the programs but the fact that they were not being used. Some of the very things I feared 28 months ago, did, in fact, take place (he had assembled minority officers and wives at Washington months before)... The most destructive influence on the resolution of racial problems is self-deception. It is self deception to think that you can legislate attitudes, you cannot.

²See NAVOP-R101704Z/19Z Nov. 72 ZEO ZOC (underlining is by the author).

It is self deception to feel a program is a reality, it is not. It is self deception to think that the Navy is made up of some separate species of man--that Navy personnel come to us fresh from some other place than our world--that they come untainted by the prejudices of the society that produced them, they do not. It is self deception to consider that all issues involving Blacks and Whites are solely racial in motivation, they are not. And, finally, it is self deception to consider the Navy or any other military organization as free wheeling--to each his own way."³

After this roasting the message was fired as a NAVOPS message to all subordinate commands and released to the Press. The act of releasing the speech to the press got Zumwalt into trouble with Congress. This reeked of public admonishment of high level staff. Admiral Zumwalt, on learning of the bad press and political ramifications caused by his remarks did some clarifying via the immediate release of Z-Gram #117. The House Sub-Committee notes this on page 17669-17670 of its report of Kittyhawk/Constellation incidents.

This writer was in Mexico at the time the foregoing was in progress and got his information from the New York Times and the English language daily published for Americans there. I became alarmed when the speech became political. It is a fact of history that no officer has ever survived causing the Navy adverse publicity since the Somers mutiny of 1842. My alarm was exacerbated by the fact that two Presidents had paid with their lives for tampering with America's Black/White thing. Could a Chief of Naval Operations do so and survive. This writer (as noted in the Appendix) witnessed, as a Navy Steward, an invisible man in a white coat, the severe racist feelings unleashed by the Roosevelt (1942) and Truman (1948) attempts to integrate the Navy. He also knew what these feelings contributed to their failures.

³For full text of this speech see message designate R-101704Z-19Z Nov. 72-ZEO-ZOC. (Underlining is that of the writer and is for sake of highlighting pertinent sections of quote.)

The mystery deepens when one asks ones self, "Why did Zumwalt proceed in Phase I of the Navy's Human Goals program by choosing the "awareness process" when safer, more polite tools were available?" The reason seems to rest in the text of his speech to Washington area Flag Officers, especially the section on self deception. It would appear that he did not back down. Rather, he ordered all Navy men and officers to receive racial awareness training by the end of fiscal year 1973 (June). This racial awareness effort was designed for 20 hours and was called UPWARD which means Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity. The feelings surfaced by UPWARD reached an intensity that often precluded Navy men even addressing the other components of Phase I, such as the (1) survey, and (2) command action plan formulation.

Misinformation and Misunderstanding Tending to Retard Learning by Human Resources Graduate Students.

As an example, most of my students arrive at the Postgraduate School still angry about the Phase I seminar. Those who did not attend are usually in possession of negative misinformation imparted by friends who did attend. Those who did not attend UPWARDS usually arrive, due to misinformation, with ideas concerning the Human Goals course that range from expectations of "touchy-feely" type sensitivity training to intense "T-Group Methods."

As an Instructor, I have found that you can usually expect hostility to surface early in the Human Goals class from some one who attended a "badly run UPWARD" (there were many due to some bad facilitators). The hostility is usually verbalized: "You're not going to change me!" or "I was more prejudiced after I attended that damned UPWARD than I was before!" After encouraging, aiding and abetting this ventilation I simply say, "I hope that you really learn what happened to you by the time we complete the communications segment

of study." Most students do just that. What has usually happened is that on entering UPWARD students have done what most of us do--avoid psychic pain by tucking negative perceptions of race into comfortable corners of their gentlemanly skulls. The UPWARD Seminar was designed to surface the suppressed sensory data. When this happens people are faced with the discomfort of facing noxious stimuli which frustrates and angers them. As for a 20 hour or even a 60 hour seminar, for the matter, changing an adult, the chances are remote indeed.

In spite of the emotional upheaval generated by Phase I, according to the Systems Development Corporation, the controversial seminar did what it was designed to do--that is, "raise the awareness" of personnel in the area of existing race problems. Researchers used a sample numbering of 112 commands and control groups and collected data from 5,659 personnel who had not participated in a seminar in April/May 1973. Researchers returned to 108 of the original commands in September/October 1973 and re-interviewed 4,541 of its original population. Of these 1,323 had participated in seminars between April and October 1973; with the remaining 3,218 having not attended. Systems Development Corporation drew its conclusions from data collected from personnel who attended and those who did not. Those who did not attend a seminar were utilized as a Control Group. These are some of the findings indicating that the program was effective. (See page v and page 2-4.)

It is evident that the Race Relations Education Program was effective in the increasing awareness of:

- personal worth and racial dignity,
- inequities in opportunity for minority personnel,
- differences between potential and actual effectiveness of individuals, groups and programs in improving race relations in the command.

Furthermore the program promoted:

- agreement among Blacks and Whites on important command racial issues,
- personal commitment toward the elimination of racism with all Navy sectors,
- more positive attitudes toward the Navy (than non-program participants).

White senior enlisted and officer personnel were less affected than other surveyed personnel. This probably accounts for the lag in development of command action plans which should have followed.

This writer has found, after teaching and questioning students for one and one-half years that most students become emotionally involved and lose sight of Phase I's seminar goal. Consequently, many mentally assigned goals to UPWARD which it was never designed to achieve.

Phase I - Commencement of the Human Resources Management Cycle: Each evolution whether an HRAV or Phase II requires its own HRM cycle (See Appendix A).

Methodology and Underlying Approach used by Human Resources Management Center Personnel.

1. The main tool of the HRMC specialist is sound organizational development practice. The Commanding Officer (CO) is approached with the same courtesy and respect as that afforded a top executive in any business corporation. He and his staff are treated as clients. HRM specialists go to lengthy means to get the CO and his staff to "buy into" the HRM program. Under no circumstances are "I am the expert" or coercive approaches backed by law, even implied. The eradication of suspicion and fear is absolutely necessary for any positive HRM effort. Consequently, the prospective client (CO) and whoever he may designate are visited from a month to six weeks in advance by the CO of the training center, who holds the rank of Captain. This removes the obstacle implied by "some kid telling me how to run my ship/squadron." As the top representative of the HRMC he explains the program with great clarity to the client. He further works at establishing a climate of confidentiality between the

center and the client--a cornerstone of the total HRM effort and one of the most meaningful breakthroughs in Naval history.

This concept formerly existed in American society between only certain professionals and their clients. For example, between doctors, psychiatrists, lawyers and their clients and between news reporters and their informants (still hazy and a current focus of scholars in Jurisprudence). The concept is totally new to military institutions and for this reason is often beyond the realm of belief to most CO's. Yet the concept and its inclusion as part of HRM programs is backed by an ALNAV instruction/message, which stipulates that only the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Personnel (ADCNO) possesses authority to view or allow the viewing of data from a command. Any viewing or assessment of these data by other than the CO/client and the HRMC people is thoroughly discouraged by Washington. In short, an Admiral cannot view data gathered aboard a subordinate's ship or in a squadron or station, on grounds it would constitute a breach of confidentiality. This has caused some eyebrow raising among retired Admirals, Captains and Type Commanders--a Junior has authority to withhold information from a Senior? Stange but true.

2. The first entry into Phase I was focused on sensitizing and raising the awareness of all Naval personnel in the race relations area of HRM. The principle tool was the UPWARD (Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity) seminar. The second component was focused upon problem identification data gathering via surveys and interviews. This is movement from Phase I to the prelude of HRAV. The third component consists of (1) taking the data ashore for computerization, and (2) returning to the command with printouts and interpreting the data findings for the Captain and designated staff.

If a CO questions the data findings it is his prerogative to ask for more validation. This is usually done by carrying out "spot interviews" with

personnel in the problem area concerned. On being satisfied the CO, utilizing the data findings, assigns a staff group to develop the Command Action plan (CAP). He may call upon HRMC people to assist in this at any time or he may elect to wait until his HRAV standown (five days) to seek upgrading or modification of the CAP. A viable CAP should contain, as a minimum:

- a. A full statement of each problem or issue addressed,
- b. The objectives addressed for each problem/issue area,
- c. Course of action and in the better CAP's a time schedule for accomplishing objectives.
- d. Note on potential or anticipated trouble spots in each course of action and tentative methods for dealing with them,
- e. Target dates for completion of objectives and assessment of movement toward the CAP goal.

3. Whether the CAP is developed as a closing component of Phase I or is done during the HRAV the same method is used (workshops) to assist the command.

Persons involved in CAP workshops should include:

- a. The CO, XO and Department heads - top management,
- b. Division officers - middle management,
- c. CPO/heading PO level - line management,
- d. Lower PO ratings and/or seamen - line workers. The representatives of this latter group must be carefully picked for personality, knowledge and according to whether they enjoy the respect of the crew.

Unit action. The ongoing implementation and monitoring of actions set forth in the CAP and follow-on activities requested by the commanding officer make up steps 6 and 7 of the HRM cycle.

As the time sequence in the cycle moves toward Phase II a stopgap type reassessment component (the HRAV) is inserted in order to facilitate proper linkage between Phase I and Phase II. Thus the client group is brought to a degree of readiness prior to Phase II entry.

4. Scope of survey/interview data coverage: a key to pre HRAV readiness and assessment as to where a command is in psychic progression.

- a. Supervisory leadership (support, team building, goal emphasis, work facilitation),
- b. Peer leadership (support, team building, goal emphasis, work facilitation),
- c. Command climate,
- d. Additional (work coordination, satisfaction, integration of men and mission, results, training),
- e. Human Goals program areas (overseas diplomacy, EO/RR, drugs, alcohol, career counseling).

In the survey for forward deployed units and overseas shore activities the HRM cycle will include an addendum of ten questions and an overseas issues identification meeting. Thus little time is lost on "rehash-type" argumentation.

PRELUDE TO PHASE II OF THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS EFFORT:
ITS PROGRAMS AND PROCESSES

What the Navy has essentially done in Phase I is said to all hands, "We've made you 'aware,' now carry out the program." The program does not limit itself to race relations alone. Instead the program's goal is aimed at (1) improving the quality of life for all Navy personnel and their families. As a further example, the Navy has recently granted women the status of minorities to insure that sexism will not retard their careers nor restrict them to the "low prestige" duties that they traditionally performed in the past. (2) Extending the leadership reach of its leaders by educating them to deal with this generation of young people with their different life-styles and needs. The realization is that they are our personnel pool. It is our duty to utilize them in the best possible manner. These are the factors that carry weight at the Defense Department.

Basically the Human Goals program has been codified and all of its program fragments have been focused in five broad areas:

- (1) Human resource management,
- (2) Equal opportunity and race relations,
- (3) Drug abuse education control and alcoholism countermeasures,
- (4) Intercultural relations,
- (5) Organizational development - Principle method of program implementation and maintenance is woven as a methodology throughout the education and training effort.

The overall Human Goals program objectives are:

- (1) To ensure the development of the full personal and professional potential of all Navy men and women, regardless of race, creed, color or national origin;

- (2) To ensure the application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in the performance of the Navy's primary mission;
- (3) To improve the Navy as a professional organization which recognizes the worth and dignity of all its personnel and thus ensure increased capacity to attract and retain high caliber personnel;
- (4) To impart enough hard knowledge of intercultural relations to enhance potential for accomplishment of the Navy's fourth mission beyond the seas (extend and assist American diplomacy).

The Human Resources Management Availability (HRAV)

The reader should remember that the components of Phase I, which starts the Human Goals Resource Management cycle of Human Goals, consists of three components: (1) the UPWARD seminar, (2) the information survey and based upon survey feedback data, and (3) the creation of a Command Action Plan (CAP) for dealing with identifiable problems in the command. The Human Resources Management Availability (HRAV) is a five day stand-down. From talking with my students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), I find that most feel that it facilitates taking better advantage of Phase II if the HRAV precedes Phase II of HRM program. This, however, is not a program requirement. The relevant factor of HRAV is that it assists Navy programs in meeting the exacting criteria of OD -- an ongoing interactive process. This five day series of seminars and workshops is probably the best current indicator that the Navy means business and intends that this effort go beyond the "get your card punched" perception to actual institutionalization of HRM programs. If the HRAV is measured in time and money, the cost is mind-boggling. As examples:

- (1) In order for Type-Commanders to afford each ship five days for an intense effort in HRM this "software" program had to be made a part of the agenda for operations and planning conferences held by Fleet Commanders.
- (2) That the Navy has less than 500 ships to carry out a global commitment imposes a rigorous operating schedule on most units. The taking of five workdays for HRM in itself, drives home to unit commanders and their power brokers the importance of HRM programs as perceived by Washington. Action here probably exceeds words if we weigh impact quality.
- (3) The Navy's aim is to eventually have all commands rotate through the HRAV evolution every 18 months.

A Junction of HRAV:

1. If a ship or command has experienced trouble in pulling from survey data a prioritized list of problems to address or does not know how to develop a command action plan (CAP) Human Resources Management specialist (HRMS) attached to the Human Resources Management Center (HRMC) or Human Resources Management Detachment (HRMD) will assist in teaching command people.⁴
2. If the command's CAP proves weak and ineffective, HRM center specialist will assist command in upgrading same. Often a reevaluation and interpretation of data is indicated, or clarification and smoothing of format and language could be the problem. Whatever the problem, assistance is available at HRMC during the standown. Often the need may indicate lack of communications skills or bad lateral/vertical communication.
3. Any area germane to the CAP among those covered in the initial survey may be reassessed. As an example the survey data covers (a) supervisory leadership, (b) peer leadership, (c) command climate, (d) work group coordination, (e) human goals areas such as equal opportunity and race relations (EO/RR) drugs, alcohol, and career counseling and communication effectiveness.

It should perhaps, for the sake of clarification, be pointed out that the time interval between Phase I and the HRAV is from 6 to 12 months.

The Prelude to an HRAV - Stage Setting.

For a broad view of the Naval Human Resources Management cycle process see Appendix C. If careful scrutiny is given the schema, it is possible to see how the methodology of applied organizational development is utilized throughout. The schema shows Phase I from the initial contact with the command (client) to the formulation of the command action plan (CAP) later negotiation and planning for the HRAV (see 5a). At the actual HRAV five day standdown (see step 6) the following is done:

⁴For full understanding of abbreviations in HG program see Part I

1. Development or modification of⁵ the command action plan - emergent from survey data and/or interviews.
2. Based upon feedback from the command, discuss actual problems and secure agreement on the needs of the unit (needs may include upgrading communication, training in group problem solving techniques, document formulation, etc.
3. Secure agreement with client-command upon the HRAV program design (all are unique) and processes involved in addressing the identifiable problem areas.
4. The workshop method is utilized to upgrade, train and educate command people toward "command self-sufficiency"--an end goal of the Human Resources Management effort. No longer do outside experts "lay their trip" on a command and leave them with the problems. HRMS trans a Command Training Team (CTT) which assists the CO and members of the ship's company.

Note that training/education progression is movement from (1) awareness toward race relations/equal opportunity, (2) other command problems and their identification (data gathering and interpretation), and (3) tentative plan for addressing these problems.

The Commander, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in the fall of 1973 asked the CO of HRMC, San Diego to carry out an experiment aimed at saving valuable time. The experiment consisted of testing the feasibility of carrying out both the HRAV and Phase II evolutions in one five day period. It developed, according to recent HRMC visitors to the Naval Postgraduate School, that this could be done with small ships complements (Destroyers, Frigates, LST, etc.). But tended to overwhelm HRMC resources where large commands (Aircraft carriers, Cruisers, Stations, etc.) are concerned. Where one team could handle a small command, a large carrier, for example, could involve three or four HRMC teams in order to carry out one evaluation. Further many Captains preferred to undergo the HRAV and Phase II separately. Consequently they were given that option which in turn gave them a certain flexibility in scheduling HRM evaluation and which further characterizes the agency/client approach.

⁵Naval Instructional Technology Development Center, San Diego, Content Reduction of Human Goals Program (March 1975).

PHASE II EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/RACE RELATIONS (EO/RR)

This phase of the Human Resources Management cycle builds upon the raised awareness in Phase I and the training, modifications and impetus generated by the HRAV linkage between Phase I and Phase II, where the Phase I data was utilized to develop the Command Action Plan (CAP). Data from the Phase II cycle process is used to develop the Affirmative Action Plan (AAP). The basic difference in the two documents is that the:

1. CAP is unlimited in its scope. The CAP may address any problem in the Human Resources Management spectrum ranging from general ships climate through bad communications, malfunctioning justice systems to education, training or race relations.
2. The AAP is limited as it is problem specific to economic opportunity/race relations.

The CAP derives its actual legal underpinnings from the Defense Department's credo as actualized by the U. S. Navy. The AAP derives its legal foundations from laws established by an act of Congress, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968. These acts cover not just the military institutions, but all civilian institutions as well. As examples, law enforcement, industry, public education, etc. The Navy's functional program cycle is concerned with:

The current EO/RR program builds on the awareness generated by race relations seminars (UPWARDS/Executive) that were the nucleus of Phase I. The goal of Phase II is the achievement of equal opportunity and treatment of all personnel through the establishment of command environments that encourage organizational and individual actions to address practices that contribute to racism.

Here it is inferred that racism tends to demean both whites and minorities. the Navy is in process of retraining Race Relations Facilitators and Education

Specialists (RRF/RRES) for the broader designated specialization as Equal Opportunity Program Specialist (EOPS). These new specialists receive heavy training in consultant and organizational development skills. The difference in the Human Resources Management Specialist and the Equal Opportunity Program Specialist is centered in where each is assigned in the HRM program structure, both possess some of the same capabilities (more officers are HRM's). While the HRMS is assigned to an HRM Center or an HRM Detachment which serves Type Commands the EOPS is assigned to the staff of the Type Commander where he acts as consultant to the staff and the ships under that staff. He is the operational commands creature.

As the core of the HRM program is the CAP, the actual key to the achievement of equal opportunity is the AAP. Both are derived from the HRM cyclical process. Both plans are capable of being monitored and updated at any point in time.

The main features of the EO/RR cycle component of the program are much like those processes in Phase I except that this program's structural aspects contain greater specificity. As an example the AAP must be designed to trigger and sustain actions that will:

- (1) ensure equal opportunity for all personnel,
- (2) counter the negative forces of racism in a manner that aims at its eradication, and
- (3) promote understanding and acceptance of cultural differences and preferences.

It is a requirement that all Commanding Officers develop, implement and promulgate a viable, affirmative action plan (AAP). To insure its relevance the plan is to be updated periodically in accordance with unit needs. The only limitation on plan function rests in its appropriateness to a command's mission, its size and the impingements of local conditions.

Throughout this cycle HRMS and EOPS act as consultants and assist with the development and implementation of the AAP. The process consists of:

- (1) The gathering and interpreting of data relevant to EO/RR and the development of Equal Opportunity Quality Indicators (EOQI's).
- (2) Conducting of a series of five workshops (see steps 5 and 7 of cycle in Appendix C).
- (3) Carry out follow-up assistance (see step 9) as needed for program maintainance.

THE PHASE II EDUCATION/TRAINING PROCESS

1. Initial contact and negotiation with the Commanding Officer (CO) and whoever else the CO may designate.
2. Schedule a data collection visit in order to generate data needed to to develop EOQI's, the key to monitoring the EO/RR aspects of Phase II.

Perhaps it is relevant that we understand, at this point, what an EOQI is.

The EOQI's are instruments that enable a commanding officer to check those aspects of his command pertinent to EO/RR for quality and to ascertain whether equal opportunity exists. It is a truism that "all men are created equal but some are treated more equal than others." Whether all personnel are treated equally is too often found on paper rather than existing in fact. The Navy has wisely devised a way to check the quality of that ambiguous quantity that we refer to as equality. EOQI does so by graphic presentation. These instruments (EOQI's) remove the built-in blinders from those at the top of the specialized bureaucratic structure charged with operational commands. As an example, skilled EOPS/HRMS personnel can check:

- (a) A command's retention rate (how many men reinlisted);
- (b) Upward mobility (example: (1) how many men were eligible for "A" school? (2) Broken down by race, how many actually attended?) of the various racial, ethnic or religious groups;
- (c) The administration of military justice over a semi-annual or annual period and pull from this data a good assessment of the presence or absence of EO.

These aspects of command tell a lot about its overall climate. That this is so angers or frightens only those commanding officers and staffs who are too uninformed to really conceptualize the great potential utility of this program segment. For if EOQI's are used within the current "spirit of the HRM programs" they may ...assist the commanding officer to identify areas that may warrant greater exploration and action.⁶ Action that could prevent a Kittyhawk/Constellation incident.

To further understand this tool and its potential let's look at how it can be utilized as a source of "real information" for the busy CO/Staff, thus enabling him to engage in pro-active action, capable of preventing racial incidents. It is pertinent here probably to point out that real information is primary to pro-active command behavior and riot prevention. "Rumor," on the other hand, minus pro-active behavior takes over command and places the commander in the vulnerable position of reactive behavior--the stuff of which race riots are made as it precludes preventive action. For sake of clarity, as to positive usage of EOQI's, let's look at one EOQI area. Suppose that after sifting six months of a commanding officer's administration of military justice at a given level that EOPS/HRMS consultants found that of 100 white seamen committing a given infraction, 75% were given non-judicial punishment and/or reprimands. Of 100 Blacks committing similar offenses, 25% were given non-judicial punishment and reprimands and 75% were either court martialed or discharged, administratively. This could alert a CO to really start looking carefully at the racial attitudes of his subordinates and introspectively at himself--possibly into the perceptions of his minority crew members. As an example "do they perceive themselves as victimized by racist immediate supervisors?" "Do they feel that the CO is unsympathetic toward them?"

⁶Ibid., p. 35.

Sometimes it may be found that a CO has really treated, judicially, all hands fairly, yet one or both factions (could be young whites or Blacks, or both groups) really feel that one or the other is "favored" by the CO. There may not exist any evidence to support these perceptions, yet these misconceptions have created deep seated feelings of persecution damaging to the image of the CO and the command climate. The EOQI findings in such an instance offers a CO two options:

Option 1. He could say, "Those sore heads are just hunting something to "bitch" about and ignore the negative feelings, or

Option 2. The CO may choose, via pro-active behavior, to counter these feelings by the wide dissemination of the findings and their meanings, thus sharing "real information" with his crew.

Option 1 would be reactive and would do nothing toward solving the problem while allowing misconceptions to cause deterioration of morale and kindle animosities and generate actions conducive to negative racial incidents. Whether these feelings have any basis in reality is irrelevant--they are there. They exist. They may or may not escalate and therein lies the potential danger.

Option 2 on the other hand allows a CO to reiterate the rights of his young people but to also place the onus of responsibility on them for their behavior. In this way crew members enmeshed in misconception are forced by factual data to do the requisite introspective thinking necessary to deal with the real world situation in which they find themselves.

If EOQI's reveal a trend that could be interpreted as racist or grossly insensitive where minority crew members are concerned, it may prove inappropriate to the solution of the problem to disseminate its findings as it could alert those who have in some manner remained untouched and escalate those feelings of minorities affected. Therefore, the better part of valor would be for the

CO to move at once toward rectifying the trend and informing key staff of his desires: that they look carefully at all report slips prior to instituting proceedings. The EOQI is the key to monitoring, qualitatively, the negative or positive functions of the AAP.

Where surveys and interviews were utilized for problem identification in developing the CAP, the AAP approach utilizes (1) workshops to educate/train a command's power brokers, and (2) research needed to develop EOQI's, serving as an AAP monitoring tool for the CO and his staff.

EOQI's serve another purpose. They assist the CO in identification of those areas that may need greater, in depth, exploration and action.

It is pertinent at this juncture to point out that future command self sufficiency has been set in motion as a prelude to Phase II. For example:

1. The EOPS will have gone aboard ship or to the Air Squadron or Seabee unit, etc., and trained a Command Training Team (CTT) composed of client/unit personnel appointed by the CO and his staff.
2. During the Phase II workshop series these CTT trainees will actualize their training under the watchful eyes of EOPS trainers. All CTT members qualify as trainers by actually conducting workshops and undergoing post workshop critiques with EOPS and HRMC personnel, during Phase II.
3. Since only the key command power brokers are able to attend the HRAV and/or Phase II, responsibility falls to the CTT to put the rest of the crew through the workshops and acquainting them with a composite picture of the Human Resources Management program.
4. The CTT is a resource, in being, who assist the CO and his Human Relations Council with problems in the EO/RR area on an ongoing basis.

If the CTT is backed by the CO and is positively projected as an organ representing the CO in the welfare of all hands, along with his Human Relations Council, it can relieve the CO of much of the petty, burdensome details such as hot lines, etc., by dealing positively with many petty grievances at the division level. Under no circumstances should the CTT allow itself to be projected as merely mitigators between Blacks and Whites. Rather, its ideal image should be that of an assistance arm of the CO, interested in the welfare of all hands. Since it is a "compensatory tool" it would be easy for other crew members to, by induced perceptions and mental sets imparted by recent history, make the CTT a "Black/White thing." This would be tragic as whites would assume that the CTT is not meant to serve them. If projected as an all-hands organ a CTT can help in strengthening the chain of command. It should not be limited to merely conducting workshops. The team could well be an extension of the Human Relations Council and thus, positive command influence. It should be evident to the reader at this point that the Navy HRM program:

1. Has increased its sophistication during its short history,
2. Does not depend on fragile, naive, altruistic or do-goodism type approaches,
3. Does not coerce illy prepared people into emotion laden (EO/RR) areas minus proper preparation,
4. Does move participants by definite evolutionary process (organizational development) toward a high degree of readiness for the next stage or phase during the latent period between phases.

The equal opportunity/counter racism workshop and other workshops are attempted only after much preparation, as indicated in the preceding explanation. Workshops for Phase II are conducted after the EOPS analyzes and organizes the EOQI's and data made available by the HRM survey. It cannot be reiterated enough that the "expertism" approach applied by over-zealous race-relations facilitators in Phase I and which angered as many people as it helped, has been eliminated by the HRM Program Directors.

WORKSHOPS UTILIZED AS PHASE II:
EDUCATION AND TRAINING MEDIA-

1. The Human Resources Management Cycle and Equal Opportunity Workshop.

This workshop introduces participants to the HRM cycle, as a process, its legal underpinnings: (a) The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, and (b) The Navy's Equal Opportunity Manual - OPNAV Instruction 5354.1 (May 29, 1974), discusses other workshops and their functions, and, specifically, how these are applied in Phase II. The goal and objectives of this phase are clearly stated along with their rationales during this introduction-type workshop.

The CO determines who attends this workshop. Usually the CO, XO, department heads, middle-management, line-management and selected line-worker representatives. However, the CO is given wide latitude where this workshop is concerned. He may:

- (a) Elect to accept or reject this workshop based on his personal perceptions of command need, or
- (b) Include or exclude any level of command representation which he chooses to.

It is participants in this workshop who are usually charged with the development, refinement, upgrading and implementation of the AAP.

2. The Affirmative Action Planning Workshop. The purposes of this workshop are to:

- (a) Impart to the participants the actual skills needed to develop or upgrade an AAP.
- (b) Develop an AAP appropriate to command needs.

3. Actions to Counter Racism Workshop (ACR). This workshop is a required evolution for all Division Officers, Warrant Officers, Division Chiefs and

Leading Petty Officers (middle management and line supervisors). The objectives of this workshop are to:

- (a) Impart to personnel a clear understanding of equal opportunity as defined by the Navy.
- (b) Teach, discuss and drill participants on actions necessary to counter racism.
- (c) Assist participants in the development of conduct needed, via role-modeling, to support, maintain and promulgate a viable affirmative action plan.

4. The Military Rights and Responsibilities Workshop. This workshop is required of all personnel in pay grades E-1 to E-4. The objective purpose of this workshop is to:

- (a) Ensure that problems are resolved at the lowest appropriate command level.
- (b) Emphasize and clarify the Chain of Commands responsibility towards each individual - see that young people know their rights under Naval law, as a two-edged, sword-type service tool.
- (c) Ensure that sailors know their responsibility to the Navy, its missions, their country, themselves and the Chain of Command.

This workshop is not conducted by EOPS or HRMS's. It is conducted by Command Training Team (CTT) members appointed by the CO and, as previously indicated, under the EOPS and/or HRMS's supervision during Phase II. The end goal of this workshop is to really get young people to realize what their swearing in ceremony meant and to understand that rights can only be realized if backed by responsibility.

5. The Cultural Expression Workshop. The central theme throughout this workshop is that the Navy draws a portion of its strength from the cultural diversity of its men and home.⁷ Here the participant is reminded that we

⁷Phase II - Equal Opportunity/Race Relations - Consultant Guide, Vol. I, NAVPERS 1525.9 (see Cultural Expression in the Navy Workshops).

are a pluralistic society composed of peoples from nearly all parts of the globe. Most races, colors, creeds, religions and ethnic groups may be found in this country. The Navy in developing this workshop took into consideration that unless an American serviceman learns to appreciate the positive aspects of cultural pluralism in his own country, it is doubtful if he can appreciate the varied cultures of host nations beyond the seas. A bigot importing his bigotry to other countries cannot assist the Navy in its fourth mission - act as an extension of the diplomatic arm of the United States. Nor does this workshop limit itself to the appreciation of foreign cultures. The subcultures in this country are dealt with. The sophistication of this workshop is further enhanced by its movement from the vertical aspects of stereotyped stratification based upon race, ethnics, etc., to the lateral aspects which deal with what I call sub-subcultures. Let's take an example of this on a typical American ship. The term Boatswain's Mate elicits certain negative stereotyped perceptions from other highly technical ratings. The stereotype goes like this: A Boatswain's Mate is a guy who wears a No. 6 hat and number 13 shoes - indicating that he is a stupid oaf. In the Cultural Expression Workshop personnel are reminded that there is no way, except long apprenticeships, to develop a seasoned Boatswain's Mate. If the Boatswains did not do their work, any steel ship would be a derelict within three months.

Further, it is the Boatswain and his gang who carry out rigging for refueling at sea, stores transfer, etc., without which sustained operations would be impossible. "He's not so dumb," is what comes across. Another very unique feature of the Cultural Expression Workshop is that it allows for the emotion-laden racial feeling surfaced in the Phase I UPWARD Seminar to be massaged in a controlled environment, and worked through. As an

example, all parties to the discussion agree to "be down front" - "tell it like it is" - say how they really feel. Consequently, the impact of "little things" that often escape busy staff people are surfaced. I am quite sure that few Admirals and Generals, Captains and Colonels "have in their gut" the deep-seated animosities and potential for violence of feelings generated around, (1) food, (2) hair, (3) dress and (4) symbolics such as the "dapping" (the elaborate handshake Blacks use). Examples:

- (a) Music: In a bar, Whites want hillbilly, Blacks want jazz and Mexican-Americans want Latino.
- (b) Food: At the Base Mess only typical American fare is served to the chagrin of minorities - Blacks want "soul-food", Orientals want rice, Mexicans want tamales, etc.
- (c) Clothing: Whites emulate John Wayne with boots and cowboy hats, Philippinos wear barongs (elaborate national shirt), Blacks wear Dashekis, beads and amulets (bright African).
- (d) Hair: Nothing in modern times possibly has generated more hostility than the "Afro-hair" style in vogue among Blacks and the "long-hair" affected by certain groups of young Whites. All of these symbols of the youth revolt are allowed free-rein discussion here.

Further, sailors are told that the Navy draws strength and talent from its diversity and that each person has the right to practice his or her culture - so long as it does not interfere with the Navy's mission. As an example, when Dr. Downs, an Anthropologist attached to HRMC San Diego, informed the group that it would be some years before they could wear their "righteous threads" (mod-type or ethnic clothing) in the Indian Ocean area, a howl went up. Dr. Downs explained that in visiting the African, East Indian, and Arabic state consulates he found that nothing made Americans look worse to host-nationals of this area than our mode of dress. Consequently, we would have to, for some years, embrace the "international tenets of good grooming". He also explained that the Japanese, for instance, had observed Americans, at close quarters for 30 years, and the

Philippinos have known us much longer. Thus, we could take liberties in our dress in those areas.

A young Black in the group who had said little up to the time exploded with, "Man, you mean to tell me that I can't go ashore at Mombasa (Kenya) in my Dasheki when I meet my African brothers? I'm gonna be mad as hell!" Some young hip-type Whites joined in support of this youngster. Dr. Downs, again, patiently explained that even Africans only know us through Hollywood movies. He then posed the question, "If you were a Kenyan policeman and saw John Wayne, Superfly, Easy Rider and Shaft-type people coming over the bow of a visiting American ship, what would you do - taking into consideration the violence depicted in those movies?" This failed to disperse the young Black's feelings of outrage. At this point, this writer interjected, "Look brother, let me ask you a question. What is the Navy's fourth mission?" The reply: "Assist the diplomatic effort overseas." Then said, "Yesterday you attended the Military Rights and Responsibilities Workshop and was reminded that you swore to assist in any and all Navy missions. Now, if the success or failure of the mission hinged upon your not wearing the Dasheki, what would be your responsibility?" Finally, a positive reply, "If it was run down thata way for me, I guess I'd hafta buy into it." Note that this youngster had picked up a bit of the jargon (buy-in) of organizational development.

In parting, it becomes evident that the Navy has moved from inaction to reaction into pro-active behavior. Further, the Equal Opportunities Manual, OPNAV Instruction 5354.1 (May 29, 1974) informs all power brokers in no uncertain terms that:


Insensitivity, racism and sexism cannot coexist with a productive equal opportunities program. Therefore,

Commanders must identify through personal contact, performance counseling, dialogue or other communicative means at their disposal, those persons, regardless of race, cultural or ethnic backgrounds or sex, whose actions are inimical to cooperation and understanding among members of all races, cultural or ethnic backgrounds and between the sexes.

This document further states with great clarity what disposition is to be made of officers, enlisted and civilian personnel who do not exhibit ability to buy into the Human Goals Program. Roughly, the process resembles what all baseball umpires allow a batter - 3 strikes. For the first offense, one is counseled; second offense, one is disciplined; and the third offense, Commanders are directed to process that person for discharge.


Probably, the reason that I, as a Black-Man and Cynic, can finally believe in this program effort rests on the program structural area dealing with accountability. The Navy has learned that you cannot drive a program aimed at social change from Washington, D.C., as it could be retarded, like Roosevelt's and Truman's efforts, by gentlemen's agreements among subordinates. Hence, accountability rests on Fleet Commanders in Chief and every subordinate and unit Commanding officer. It is this that may cause the Navy to succeed in institutionalizing its HG Program.

United States Navy, Equal Opportunity Manual, OPNAV Instruction 5354.1, Washington, D.C., May 29, 1974, pp. 2-3.



EQUAL OPPORTUNITY QUALITY INDICATORS IIA PAYGRADE NAVY AS OF 31 DEC 73

OPNAVINST 5354.1
 29 May 1974



- MAJORITY GROUP
- LARGEST MINORITY GROUP
- 2nd LARGEST MINORITY GROUP
- OTHER MINORITIES
- CAUCASIAN
- BLACK
- MALAYAN
- INDIAN
- MONGOLIAN

29 May 1974

Instructions for graphing the attached indicator

- a. The name of the majority and largest minority, second largest minority, etc. will normally be in the first block (left side) of the graph to show the racial/ethnic profile of the command. All racial and ethnic minorities, i.e., Black, Filipino, Mexican American, Native American, Puerto Rican, Oriental American, on board must be accounted for. Additional graphs may be used to plot women profiles or other breakdowns such as non-high school graduates, etc. (For this Navy-wide sample all the races presently coded in the Central Computer were used.)
- b. In each section of the graph, a series of lines (or bars for this sample) will portray percentages of the racial and ethnic groups within a command using the total number in a particular group as the base. (For example, in this sample, the EOQI indicates that of all enlisted Caucasians in the Navy, 28% of them are undesignated strikers, 17% are designated strikers, 20% are E-4, etc.; whereas for all black enlisted men in the Navy, 49% are undesignated strikers, 12% are designated strikers, 9% are E-4, etc.)
- c. The scales of the graphs may be the same or differ, if necessary, to better illustrate sparse numbers. The same scale must be used, however, for all groups within a section of the graph. It will be assumed that the scale to the left of the graph is used for the entire group; however, if the right hand scale is used for any section, an arrow pointing to the right will be used in that section to indicate the proper scale to be used. (In this sample case the scale to the right is used for and only for the E-8 & E-9 section.)

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY FROM CONTENT REDUCTION OF NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAM

AAP	Affirmative Action Plan
ADCNO	Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
AP	Alcoholism Prevention
ARC's	Alcohol Rehabilitation Centers
ARD's	Alcohol Rehabilitation Drydocks
ARU's	Alcohol Rehabilitation Units
ATU	Alcoholism Training Unit
CAAC's	Counseling and Assistance Centers
CAP	Command Action Plan
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CNET	Chief of Naval Education and Training
CODAC's	Collateral Duty Alcoholism Counselors
DAC	Drug Abuse Control
DAES	Drug Abuse Education Specialist
DAPA	Drug Abuse Program Advisors
EOPS	Equal Opportunity Program Specialist
EOQI	Equal Opportunity Quality Indicators
EO/RR	Equal Opportunity/Race Relations
HRAV	Human Resource Management Availability
HRM	Human Resource Management
HRMC/D	Human Resource Management Centers and Detachments

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY FROM CONTENT REDUCTION
OF NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAM Cont.

HRMS	Human Resource Management Specialists
HRMST	Human Resource Management Support Teams
ISIC	Immediate Superiors in Command
LMT	Leadership and Management Training
NDACS	Navy Drug Abuse Counselor Schools
NDRC's	Navy Drug Rehabilitation Centers
OD	Overseas Diplomacy Organizational Development
ODC	Overseas Diplomacy Co-ordinators
OPNAVINST	
RAF	Racial Awareness Facilitator
RAFT	Racial Awareness Facilitator Training
SECNAVINST	

REPORT
BY THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISCIPLINARY
PROBLEMS IN THE U.S. NAVY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 2, 1973



[Pages of all documents printed in behalf of the activities of the House Committee on Armed Services are numbered cumulatively to permit a comprehensive index at the end of the Congress. Page numbers lower than those in this document refer to other subjects.]

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(11)

REPORT BY THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS IN THE U.S. NAVY

I. INTRODUCTION

During the course of the 92d Congress, there has been increasing concern in the House Armed Services Committee over the developing of more relaxed discipline in the military services. Substantial evidence of this practice reached us directly through subcommittee investigative reports and messages from concerned service members, as well as indirectly through events reported in the news media.

While generally our men have performed in an outstanding fashion during battle and other *in extremis* circumstances, on occasion there has been an erosion of good order and discipline under more normal operations. More disturbing have been the reports of sabotage of naval property, assaults, and other serious lapses in discipline afloat. Further, lawful orders have been subject to "committee" or "town meeting" proceedings prior to compliance by subordinates.

Capping the various reports were the recent serious incidents aboard U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk* and U.S.S. *Constellation*—aircraft carriers of vital importance to the naval mission in Southeast Asia.

Immediately following air operations aboard the *Kitty Hawk* on the evening of October 12, 1972, a series of incidents broke out wherein groups of blacks, armed with chains, wrenches, bars, broomsticks and other dangerous weapons, went marauding through sections of the ship disobeying orders to cease, terrorizing the crew, and seeking out white personnel for senseless beating with fists and with weapons which resulted in extremely serious injury to three men and the medical treatment of many more, including some blacks. While engaged in this conduct some were heard to shout, "Kill the son-of-a-bitch; kill the white trash; wipe him out!" Others shouted, "They are killing our brothers."

Aboard the U.S.S. *Constellation*, during the period of November 3-4, 1972, what has been charitably described as "unrest" and as a "sit-in" took place while the ship was underway for training exercises. The vast majority of the dissident sailors were black and were allegedly protesting several grievances they claimed were in need of correction.

These sailors were off-loaded as a part of a "beach detachment", given liberty, refused to return to the ship, and were later processed only for this *minor* disciplinary infraction (6 hours of unauthorized absence) at Naval Air Station, North Island, near San Diego.

Because of the inherent seriousness of these incidents, the Honorable F. Edward Hébert, chairman, House Armed Services Committee, considered it necessary to appoint this special subcommittee on November 13, 1972, to inquire at once into disciplinary problems in the U.S. Navy with particular reference to "alleged racial and disciplinary

problems which occurred recently on the aircraft carriers U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk* and U.S.S. *Constellation*."

During the course of its inquiry and hearings, which commenced on November 20, 1972, the subcommittee completed some 2,565 pages of reporter's transcript of testimony, and assembled a large volume of reports, directives, military investigations and other papers which have been the basis for this report.

II. FINDINGS, OPINIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. FINDINGS

1. The subcommittee finds that permissiveness, as defined on page 17679 of this report, exists in the Navy today. Although we have been able to investigate only certain specific incidents in depth, the total information made available to us indicates the condition could be servicewide.

2. The vast majority of Navy men and women are performing their assigned duties loyally and efficiently. The subcommittee is fully aware and appreciative of their efforts. The cause for concern, however, rests with that segment of the naval force which is either unable or unwilling to function within the prescribed limitations and up to the established standards of performance or conduct.

3. The subcommittee has been unable to determine any precipitous cause for the rampage aboard U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk*. Not only was there not one case wherein racial discrimination could be pinpointed, but there is no evidence which indicated that the blacks who participated in that incident perceived racial discrimination, either in general or in any specific, of such a nature as to justify belief that violent reaction was required.

4. The subcommittee finds that the incident aboard U.S.S. *Constellation* was the result of a carefully orchestrated demonstration of passive resistance wherein a small number of blacks, certainly no more than 20-25, in a well-organized campaign, willfully created among other blacks the belief that white racism existed in the Navy and aboard that ship. The subcommittee, again in this instance as with the incident aboard *Kitty Hawk*, found no specific example of racial discrimination. In this case, however, it is obvious that the participants perceived that racial discrimination existed. Several events were made to appear as examples of racial discrimination when, in fact, such was not the case.

5. Testimony revealed that one of the triggering devices for the dissident activity aboard *Constellation* was a misunderstanding, particularly among the young blacks, which led them to believe that in order to reduce the number of personnel aboard the ship to the authorized level, general discharges were about to be awarded to 250 black crew members.

In fact, the ship was in the process of reducing its complement by 250 personnel in order to make room for the air wing personnel who would embark prior to the forthcoming combat deployment. At the same time the captain had directed that certain records be reviewed and that those he considered to be troublemakers, if they qualified for administrative discharge, be notified of the ship's intent to commence processing of the required paperwork.

It is unfortunate that this latter discharge procedure was initiated against six crewmembers in one day without adequate explanation of the justification for such action—especially since all six were black and this promoted the feeling that racial discrimination was the cause. In addition, the lack of counselling pertaining to the poor performance marks received by those being considered for administrative discharge caused notification of pending discharge to serve as traumatic incidents to those who were to receive them.

There is strong evidence, however, that these misunderstandings were fostered and fanned by a small group of skilled agitators within the ranks of the young black seamen.

6. The subcommittee was informed that a review, conducted by Naval Personnel Research Activity, San Diego, has found no racial discrimination in the punishments awarded by the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. *Constellation*.

The subcommittee found no evidence that that conclusion was in error.

7. Discipline, requiring immediate response to command, is absolutely essential to any military force. Particularly in the forces afloat there is no room for the "town meeting" concept or the employment of negotiation or appeasement to obtain obedience to orders. The Navy must be controlled by command, not demand.

8. The subcommittee found that insufficient emphasis has been given to formal leadership training, particularly in the ranks of petty officers and junior officers.

9. The generally smart appearance of naval personnel, both afloat and ashore, has deteriorated markedly. While the subcommittee appreciates efforts to allow maximum reasonableness in daily routines, there is absolutely no excuse for slovenly appearance of officers and men in the Navy uniform and such appearance should not be tolerated.

10. There was no formal training of the master-at-arms force. There was not effective utilization of the Marine force. Certainly there was no contingency plan for the coordination of these two forces in events such as these. Once the activities started, there was no plan which would have acted to halt them. The result was to let them wear themselves out.

11. The members of the subcommittee did not find and are unaware of any instances of institutional discrimination on the part of the Navy toward any group of persons, majority or minority.

12. Black unity, the drive toward togetherness on the part of blacks, has resulted in a tendency on the part of black sailors to polarize. This results in a grievance of one black, real or fancied, becoming the grievance of many. Polarization is an unfortunate trend and negates efforts since 1948 to integrate the military services and to stamp out separation. This divisive trend must be reversed.

13. Nonmilitary gestures such as "passing the power" or "dapping" are disruptive, serve to enhance racial polarization, and should be discouraged.

14. After the incidents on *Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation*, a meeting was called by the Secretary of the Navy of all of the admirals in the Washington, D.C., area in which the CNO spoke to the failure of the Navy to meet its human relations goals. Immediately thereafter, his remarks were made available to the press and sent as a message to

all hands. Because of the wording of the text, it was perceived by many to be a public admonishment by the CNO of his staff for the failure to solve racial problems within the Navy. Even though this was followed within 96 hours by Z-gram 117 which stressed the need for discipline, the speech itself, the issuance of it to the public press, and the timing of its delivery, all served to emphasize the CNO's perception of the Navy's problems. Again, concern over racial problems seemed paramount to the question of good order and discipline even though there had been incidents on two ships which might be characterized as "mutinies". The subcommittee regrets that the tradition of not criticizing seniors in front of their subordinates was ignored in this case.

15. The Navy's recruitment program for most of 1972 which resulted in the lowering of standards for enlistment, accepting a greater percentage of mental category IV and those in the lower half of category III, not requiring recruits in these categories to have completed their high school education, and accepting these people without sufficient analysis of their previous offense records, has created many of the problems the Navy is experiencing today.

16. The reduction of time in recruit training from 9 to 7 weeks, thus sending those personnel who do not qualify for advanced training in "A" schools from the street to the fleet in less than two months, appears to result in inadequate preparation for shipboard duty.

17. The investigation disclosed an alarming frequency of successful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a wide variety of ships and stations within the Navy.

B. OPINIONS

1. The subcommittee is of the opinion that the riot on *Kitty Hawk* consisted of unprovoked assaults by a very few men, most of whom were of below-average mental capacity, most of whom had been aboard for less than one year, and all of whom were black. This group, as a whole, acted as "thugs" which raises doubt as to whether they should ever have been accepted into military service in the first place.

2. The subcommittee expresses its strong objection to the procedures utilized by higher authority to negotiate with *Constellation's* dissidents and, eventually, to appease them by acquiescing to their demands and by meting out minor nonjudicial punishment for what was a major affront to good order and discipline. Moreover, the subcommittee stresses that the actions committed aboard that ship have the potential for crippling a combatant vessel in a war zone.

3. The subcommittee believes that advice concerning decisions which had to be made with regard to *Constellation*, offered by personnel in human relations billets to line officers, was uniformly poor. The decisions, made on the basis of that advice, proved unsuccessful in bringing the incident to a conclusion.

Later decisions, reflecting a reversal of the policy of negotiation with the dissident sailors, resulted in the transfer of the men off the ship in a disciplinary status.

4. The statement that riots, mutinies and acts of sabotage in the Navy are a product of "the time" is not valid. [REDACTED]

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